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Abstract
We study learning in a simulated tournament using an inter-generational framework. Here a
group of subjects are recruited into the lab and play the stage game for 10 rounds. After his
participation is over, each player is replaced by another player, his laboratory descendant,
who then plays the game for another 10 rounds as a member of a fresh group of subjects. A
particular player in generation t+1 can (1) see the history of choices by his generation t
predecessor and (2) receive advice from that predecessor via free-form messages that
generation t players leave for their generation t+1 successors. We find that the presence of
advice makes a difference in that the experimental groups who get advice perform better –
their decisions are closer to the Nash equilibrium – compared to a control group of subjects
that plays the game with no recourse to such advice.
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We study whether word-of-mouth advice from a predecessor to a successor in an 
inter-generational paradigm facilitates learning in a simulated tournament. While a particular 
game may have a clear equilibrium prediction, it is not always easy for boundedly rational 
agents to hone in on that equilibrium via a process of introspection as is often assumed in 
theoretical models of strategic behaviour. Rather agents need to engage in a considerable 
amount of learning or experimentation in order to arrive at the best response. Camerer (2003, 
Ch. 6) provides an overview of this line of work  There is evidence that advice coming from a 
person with prior experience in the game has an impact on decision making in a wide variety 
of contexts. See Schotter (2003) for a review. We describe the constituent game first and then 
explain our inter-generational framework.  
Each subject takes part in a two-person tournament similar to those described in 
greater detail in Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) and Merlo and Schotter (1999). In Bull, 
Schotter and Weigelt (1987), randomly paired subjects in each round choose an integer called 
the “decision number” (n) between 0 and 100.  This decision number has a quadratic cost 
associated with it of the form C(n) = n
2/k where “k” is a constant. After the decision number 
is chosen by each subject, a random number is generated for each subject from a uniform 
distribution over the closed interval [-a, +a]. These two numbers – each player’s decision 
number and the random number chosen for him – are added together to get the “total 
number” for a subject. Payoffs are determined by comparing the total numbers for each 
player in any pair. The player with the larger total number is awarded a larger prize M while 
the player with the smaller total is awarded a smaller prize, m where M > m. The payoff to a 
subject in any round is the difference between the prize won for that round (M or m) and the 
cost associated with the decision number that the subject chose for that particular round, i.e. 
the per period payoff is equal to M(m) - n
2/k. There is a trade-off in the choice of the decision 
number in that choosing a higher number increases the probability of winning the big prize M 
but that win comes at the expense of the higher cost and thus choosing a high number does 
not necessarily translate into a high payoff. By setting k = 500, M = 29, m = 17.2 and a = 40, 
this two person tournament has a unique Nash equilibrium at n = 37.  
In this paper, as in Merlo and Schotter (1999), we turn this two person tournament 
into an individual decision making game by replacing one of the players with a computerized 
automaton programmed to always choose n = 37. Subjects are informed that the 
computerized opponent will choose 37 in every round.  
The inter-generational framework is implemented in the following way. A group of 
subjects are recruited into the lab and play the stage game for 10 rounds (we will explain the 
exact experimental design and parameters shortly). After his participation is over, each player 
is replaced by another player, his laboratory descendant, who then plays the game for another 
10 rounds as a member of a fresh group of subjects. The generations are non-overlapping. A 
particular player in generation t+1 can (1) see the history of choices by his generation t 
predecessor and (2) receive advice from that predecessor via free-form messages that 
generation   players leave for their generation t+1 successors. While the generations are non-
overlapping still there is an inter-generational flavor in that payoffs span generations. Payoff 
to a generation t player is equal to what he has earned during his lifetime plus 100% of what 
his laboratory descendant earns. This provides an incentive to the subjects to pass on 
meaningful advice to their successors.   
t
  We can draw a parallel between our approach and the observational learning studied 
in Merlo and Schotter (2003) where players are paired with one member of the pair being the 
“doer” and the other being the “observer”. Initially the “doer” participates in a constituent 
game (very similar to ours) for a number of rounds with the “observer” watching passively and without any communication between the two. They find that the “observers”, when 
called upon to perform the same task, perform significantly better than the original “doers’. In 
our study each player in generation t+1 not only received free-form advice from the 
generation t player but can also see the decisions made by the latter. Thus the set-up is similar 
to Merlo and Schotter’s observational learning except in our set-up the observation is 
“indirect” in that the generation t+1 player is not watching “over the shoulders” of the 
generation t player but rather receives a piece of paper which shows (1) all the decisions 
made by the generation t player and the payoff outcomes of those decisions and (2) the free-
form advice left by the same player.  
  We find that the presence of advice makes a difference. The experimental groups who 
get advice perform better – their decisions are closer to the Nash equilibrium of 37 – 
compared to a control group of subjects that plays the game with no recourse to such advice. 
This is particularly true of those subjects who receive reasonably accurate advice about the 
Nash equilibrium choice.  We also find that the deviations from the Nash equilibrium decline 
over generations. We proceed as follows. In the next section we describe the experimental 
design. We present our results in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.   Experimental Design 
 
The experiments are computerized. A session starts with each subject seated in front 
of a computer. Subjects are seated far apart from one another ensuring that no one can look at 
any one else’s screen. They are handed the instructions (see the Appendix) which are printed 
on paper. Subjects are given time to read over the instructions on their own. Then the 
experimenter reads the instructions out loud. Questions are answered prior to the beginning of 
the game. Each subject then begins round 1 of the game by picking a number and entering 
this number on the user interface using his keyboard. The number “n” that the subject picks 
ranges from 0 to 100. There is a quadratic cost function associated with the number picked 
which takes the form n
2/500. Given that n varies from 0 to 100, the associated cost ranges 
from 0 to 20. See the instructions included in the Appendix for the decision cost table. The 
cost information is part of the instructions given to the subjects and the computer shows the 
particular cost associated with the number chosen once the subject has entered his chosen 
number. The computer then generates a random number for the subject and one for itself. The 
subject is told what his random number is and what the subject’s total number (decision 
number plus the random number) is. Then the subject learns whether he received the large 
fixed payment of 29 or the smaller one of 17.2. The subject’s earning for the round is the 
prize (29 or 17.2) minus the cost associated with the number chosen. For instance suppose in 
a particular round a subject picks 65. The cost associated with this effort level is 8.45. 
Suppose the random number picked by the computer for this subject is 20 while the random 
number picked by the computer for itself is 25. Then the subject’s total number is 85 (65+20) 
while the computer’s total is 62 (37+25) since the computer always chooses 37. In this case 
the subject has a larger total number and wins the larger prize of 29. Given the cost of 8.45 
associated with picking 65, his actual earning then would be 29 – 8.45 = 20.55. On the other 
hand if the subject’s total number was less than the computer’s total then the subject would 
get 17.2 minus the cost. The round then comes to an end and the next one begins. Each 
subsequent round proceeds in the same manner.  
We institute two different treatments. In our experimental treatment with advice and 
history subjects play the stage game for 10 rounds. Subjects in generation t+1, after they have 
been given the instructions and before they start round 1, receive a piece of paper which has 
the free-form advice left by the generation t predecessor and also shows the history of the 10 
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for a representative example of the history that each player receives. Thus each player gets to 
see the choices made (and the results of those choices) by the previous player and then makes 
10 choices of his own. This is true for players in all generations except the first who do not 
get to see any history of choices. Each player receives two payoffs except it works differently 
for players in the last generation and everybody else. Players in all but the last generation, get 
a first payment equal to what they earn during their lifetime of 10 rounds plus a second 
payment which is equal to the earnings of their generation t+1 successors over their 10 
rounds. This second payment is given to them at a later date. The very last generation is paid 
differently. After the players in the last generation completed their stipulated 10 rounds of the 
game, they are asked to participate in a “surprise quiz”. They are told that they will play the 
game one more time. Except the payoff from this additional decision will be 10 times the per-
round payoff of the previous 10 rounds and they will be paid the total of their earnings during 
the regular 10 rounds plus a second payment which is equal to the earnings from the surprise 
quiz.  
Behavior of this experimental group which gets to see the decisions made by the 
immediate predecessor and also receives advice from the same is compared to the behavior of 
a control group. Each subject in the control group plays the game for 20 rounds without any 
advice or history. At the end of those 20 rounds each subject in the control group takes part in 
a “surprise quiz” where they make their decision about the number one more time except the 
payoff associated with this decision is 10 times the payoff associated with each decision 
during the 20 regular rounds.  
The experiment was carried out at Rutgers University.
1 There are 60 subjects in the 
experiment. There are 10 players in the control group who play the game for 20 rounds 
without any advice or history and then take part in the surprise quiz. This gives us 200 
observations for the 20 rounds plus the 10 surprise quiz choices. Among the inter-
generational groups that play with history and advice, we have 10 families – Family 1 
through Family 10. Each family consists of five generations with players in generation t+1 
receiving advice and history from generation t before participating in 10 rounds of play. So 
we have 50 subjects in the advice treatment who make 10 decisions each for a total of 500 
observations. Moreover the player in the last generation of each of the 10 families takes part 
in the surprise quiz giving us 10 surprise quiz decisions for these advice groups. Thus we 
have 720 observations in all. Table 2 shows the exact experimental design.  
One point needs to be clarified here. Within a particular family we have five 
generations with each player in generation t+1 getting to see advice and history from 
generation t, except generation 1. Thus within a family the observations for the five players 
are not independent. However each family does constitute an independent observation. Thus 
the 10 families of subjects in the advice treatment all constitute independent observations.
2   
The payoffs are denoted in francs and experimental earnings are converted into US 
dollars at the rate of 0.0375 dollars per franc. A typical ten round session lasts about 45 
minutes while the 20 round sessions for the control groups lasted about an hour and a quarter. 
There is quite a bit of variation in earnings but on average subjects earned US $15.00.  
                                                 
1 All the sessions were run within 5 days with multiple sessions on most days. We believe that this short time-
span, coupled with the fact that subjects were recruited from a large pool, ensured that there was no 
communication between earlier and later generations.  
2 In running these experiments we face a trade-off between running more generations and running more 
families. In order for reliable patterns of behaviour to emerge it is important to run a substantial number of 
generations because it is unlikely that any interesting patterns would emerge within two or three generations. 
But the problem with running more generations is that these observations within a family are not independent. 
Thus one needs to run multiple families in order to generate independent observations. We ended up with 10 
families, each of which represents an independent observation.  
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3.   Results 
 
3.1  The Nature of the Advice Left 
 
We are interested in understanding if the presence of advice helps subjects make 
better decisions. In order to understand the impact of advice on subsequent decisions or lack 
thereof we need to analyze the nature of the advice left and quantify that advice.  
As mentioned above subjects are allowed to leave free-form advice to their 
successors. A number of subjects made explicit recommendations to their successors 
regarding what number they should choose. For instance a subject may write “You have NO 
CONTROL over the random number. So, make sure you win the decision round. To do that 
you need to select a number greater than 37. If you select too high a number, you incur high 
costs (costs seem to increase exponentially). I would recommend 38.”  In such cases the 
advice coding is easy and it is coded simply using the number that is being recommended. 
However sometimes the advice specified a range and in such cases we simply calculate the 
average of that range. A number of subjects obviously realized that there was a clue in the 
fact that the computerized opponent always chose 37 and left advice to choose close to 37 but 
“slightly above it” or variants of that such as “You should play a number higher than 37. But 
it should not be too much higher than 37 as your decision cost will also be higher.” In such 
cases where a subject did not specify a particular number but stressed that it should be “close 
to 37 but slightly above it”, we assign the number “39” to this advice. A number of subjects 
advised their successors to choose “small numbers” such as “I chose to be cost-averse.  I 
started the session choosing low numbers:  10, 30, 60, 90 . .   Each time, I found that I was 
(sic) my total number was below that of the computer’s.  However, the increasing cost of the 
larger numbers subtracted a significant portion of my 17.2 fixed payment.  In order to 
maintain the largest profit, I minimized my losses by returning to small numbers with low 
associated costs.”  All such advice suggesting “small numbers” was coded as “25”. Finally, 
possibly owing to the rather complex decision problem involved, there were a lot of subjects 
who left advice that had no substantive content at all such as “the more random and spread 
out you stay with picking your decision numbers the better it is.” or “i found that the 
combination of odd and even number helped me increase my score. but towards the end my 
total earnings went down. i think that the computer understands the pattern we put our 
numbers in. if according to our pattern our numbers exceed 100, we will earn less total 
earnings.”  These subjects do not make any specific recommendations to their successors at 
all and all such advice was coded as “101”. Figure 1 presents the distribution of advice left by 
the subjects. 17 out of 50 (34%) subjects left advice that did not make a specific 
recommendation regarding the choice of a number. But 21 subjects (42%) left advice which 
asked their successors to choose a number between 35 and 41 and 17 subjects (34%) advised 
choosing a number between 37 and 40.  
 
3.2  Groups with Advice Make Decisions Closer to the Nash Equilibrium 
 
In what follows we focus on the absolute deviations from the Nash equilibrium 
prediction of 37 rather than the actual numbers chosen by the subjects in the two groups. 
Figure 2 shows the absolute deviations from 37 for the control and the advice groups. As is 
clear from Figure 2 the deviations from 37 for the groups with advice are generally smaller 
than the deviations for the control subjects. However it is also clear that while the groups 
with advice are closer to the Nash equilibrium there is no clear convergence in either group 
over time.   
 
  4  The average absolute deviation for the control subjects is 19.01, while that of the 
advice subjects is 16.47. The difference is marginally significant using a t-test (t = 1.79, p = 
0.07) but not significant using the non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test (z = 1.27, p = 
0.20). However a more useful comparison is between the control treatment and those who 
receive a specific recommendation regarding the number to choose. We have 27 subjects (i.e. 
270 observations) who receive such advice. There are 200 observations for the control 
subjects. The mean absolute deviation for the control groups is 19.01 while that of the 
subjects with meaningful advice is 14.41 a difference that is significant both on a t-test (t = 
2.91, p = 0.00) as well as a Wilcoxon ranksum test (z = 2.63, p = 0.00). Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of absolute deviations for the two groups.  It is clear that the choices of the 
subjects who receive a specific recommendation (right panel) are closer to the Nash 
prediction of 37 (i.e. their absolute deviations are closer to zero) compared to those of the 
control subjects (left panel).  
If we look at the choices made by those who did not receive any specific advice 
versus those who did - here of course we are focusing only on the subjects who do receive 
advice – then we find that the average absolute deviation from 37 for those who receive 
meaningless advice (i.e. advice that made no specific recommendation) is 19.82 while for the 
subjects who received a meaningful recommendation the average absolute deviation is 14.41. 
The difference is highly significant using either a t-test (t = 3.30, p = 0.00) or a Wilcoxon 
ranksum test (z = 3.87, p = 0.00). This is borne out by the histograms showing the 
distribution of absolute deviations by quality of advice received in Figure 4. In Figure 4 the 
left panel shows the decisions of those subjects who receive meaningless advice (advice 
quality = 0) while the right panel shows the decisions of those subjects who get meaningful 
advice (advice quality = 1). Looking at the right panel, it is clear that the mass point of 
absolute deviations moves to the left for those who receive meaningful advice. Thus it is 
obvious that the presence of advice that makes a specific recommendation has a strong 
impact in driving decisions towards the Nash equilibrium. Figure 5 highlights this point by 
showing the absolute deviations for round 1 only for those who received meaningless advice 
in the left panel and those who received meaningful advice on the right panel. It is clear that 
there is a shift of the mass point of deviations towards zero in the right panel showing that in 
the first round of any generation, subjects who received meaningful advice made choices 
which are equal to or close to the Nash equilibrium of 37. We find that for  subjects who 
received meaningful advice the correlation coefficient between the number chosen and the 
advice received is 0.31 (p = 0.00, n = 270). If we focus on the correlation between number 
chosen in the first period (i.e. immediately after receiving the advice) and the advice received 
then this correlation increases to 0.50 (p = 0.00, n = 27). 
One question that we can ask at this juncture is the following: how much would 
history help if advice was not available? If a subject did not receive any specific 
recommendation then it would seem to make sense that this subject should look at the choices 
made by the predecessor. In order to look at the correlation between a subject’s choice and 
the numbers chosen by his predecessor, we compute the average of the 10 choices made by 
the predecessor and look at the correlation between a subject’s choice and the average choice 
made by the predecessor. This of course is relevant for the subjects in generation 2 onwards 
in the advice treatment. We find that there is strong correlation between the predecessor’s 
average choice and a subject’s own choices – a correlation coefficient of 0.11 (p = 0.02, n = 
400).  
  However if we look separately at those who received meaningful advice versus those 
who received meaningless advice then we find the following. The correlation coefficient 
between a subject’s own choices and the average choice of the predecessor is -0.12 (p = 0.16, 
n = 130) for those subjects who receive meaningless advice. While for those who receive 
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average choice of the predecessor is 0.20 (p = 0.00, n = 270).   
  If we look at the correlation between the actual number chosen by an individual 
subject and the advice left by that subject then we find that they are correlated. (Correlation 
coefficient = 0.16, p = 0.00, n = 500). This suggests the following: those who make better 
decisions (i.e. choose numbers close to 37) leave better advice, which in turn leads to better 
decisions by their successors. However if a player made “good” decisions but left “bad” 
advice then it is highly likely that his successor will make “bad” decisions since in choosing a 
number it is the advice, rather than the predecessor’s actual choices, that plays the crucial 
role.  
 
3.3  Deviations from Nash Equilibrium Decrease over Generations 
 
  We find that among the subjects in the advice treatment the absolute deviation from 
37 decreases over generations. See Table 3. Here we are taking the average of the absolute 
deviation from 37 over all 10 rounds for all players in a particular generation. The average 
absolute deviation over all 10 rounds for the 10 players in the first generation is 17.68. This 
generation does not receive advice but leaves advice. The average absolute deviation goes 
down to 15.11 in generation 2 (the first generation to receive advice) but increases in 
generation 3 to 19.42 before decreasing to 15.67 and 14.48 in generations 4 and 5 
respectively.  
  Figure 6 shows the distribution of the absolute deviations for the five generations in 
the advice treatment. For purposes of comparison we have provided the histogram for the 
control group (generation = 0) as well. As is clear from Figure 6 the mass point of the 
distribution moves towards the left (i.e. towards smaller deviations from the Nash equilibrium 
of 37) over generations. 
  In Table 4 we present some additional parametric results showing that the absolute 
deviation from the Nash equilibrium decreases over generations. Since we have data for a 
cross-section of subjects who make ten decisions each, the data has a panel structure. 
Moreover absolute deviations are bound by zero from below (when the actual decision is 
equal to 37) and by 63 from above (for decisions = 100). Thus the data is doubly censored 
and we model this using a double censored random effects Tobit regression. Furthermore, for 
this part of the analysis we will restrict our attention to only generations 2 through 5 since it 
is only these four generations which receive advice from their predecessors. The dependent 
variables include (1) “Round” which ranges from 0 to 10; (2) “Advice Received”, and (3) 
“Generation” which takes the values of 2, 3, 4 or 5. As one can see from Table 4 the 
coefficient for generation is negative and significant showing that the deviations from the 
Nash equilibrium do decrease over the four generations which receive advice. The coefficient 
for “round” is positive and significant which attests to the fact that there is little learning 
going on for individual subjects over the 10 rounds that they play.   
 
3.5  Distribution of Surprise Quiz Choices 
 
Finally we look at the surprise quiz choices made by the two groups. We have 10 
players in the control groups who each made a surprise quiz choice. We also have 10 families 
in the advice treatment with the player in the last generation of each family making a surprise 
quiz choice. The mean and median surprise quiz choices for the control groups are 44.1 and 
44 respectively while for the advice treatment the mean and the median are 55.8 and 45.5 
respectively. However if we carry out a t-test or a Wilcoxon ranksum test to test for the 
equality of the two distributions of absolute deviations then we do not find a significant 
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the same population.  
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
In this paper we have adduced evidence that in a reasonably complex decision making 
situation involving a tournament set-up, word-of-mouth advice left by players who have 
some experience in the game has an impact and helps facilitate convergence to the Nash 
equilibrium. Our results then provide corroboration to the results presented in Merlo and 
Schotter’s (2003) findings about observational learning.  
  However having made that claim we hasten to add the following two caveats. First, 
while our inter-generational set-up does bear testimony in favor of advice facilitating 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium, such convergence is rather slow. In that sense it would 
be instructive to have more than five generations in each family. More generations might help 
establish a clearer pattern. Of course one must bear in mind the trade-off between more 
generations and more families as pointed out in footnote 2 above.  
  Second, the nature of the advice left is crucial. As we have shown above, succeeding 
generations make decisions that are strongly correlated with the advice they get. However 
this has both a positive and a negative impact. When the advice received is “good”, the 
subsequent decisions are close to the Nash equilibrium. But if the advice is “bad” then that 
moves successors away from the equilibrium even if the predecessor made decisions close to 
the equilibrium. Thus the knowledge transmission over generations relies heavily on (1) an 
individual player’s ability to figure out the equilibrium best-response, (2) his ability to 
communicate that to the successor via written advice and (3) the successor’s willingness to 
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  7Table 1: Representative History of Past Plays Shown to Players in Generation 2 













1 50 14 5 64 29 24 
2 50  -11 5 39 29 24 
3 100 -28 20 72 17.2 -2.8 
4 50 23 5 73 29 24 
5 100  10 20 110 29 9 
6 50 26 5 76 29 24 
7 75  -15  11.25 60 29 17.75 
8 50 32 5 82 29 24 
9 25 32  1.25 57 17.2 15.95 









Players:         #1         #2          #3          #4          #5         #6          #7          #8          #9          #10 

































































































  8Table 3: Absolute Deviations over Generations  
 
Group  Absolute Deviation from Nash 
Prediction of 37 
Control Group   19.01 
Advice Group Generation = 1  17.68 
Advice Group Generation = 2  15.11 
Advice Group Generation = 3  19.42 
Advice Group Generation = 4  15.67 






Table 4: Random Effects Tobit Regression for Absolute Deviations from the Nash 
Equilibrium of 37 
 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Z-statistic p-value 
Round   1.018  0.215  4.74  0.000 
Advice 
Received  
0.210 0.054 3.92  0.000 
Generation   -2.963  1.323  2.24  0.025 
Constant 8.049  5.627 1.43  0.153 
Sigma_u 10.453       
Sigma_e 12.146       
Number of observations = 400  Number of groups = 80 
Wald χ
2 = 39.61  370 uncensored observations                
Prob > χ
2 = 0.000  27  left-censored observations 
Log likelihood  =   -1514.361  3 right-censored observations 
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Figure 3: Histogram of Absolute Deviations from the Nash Prediction of 37 for the 
Control and Advice treatment subjects  
 
















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of Absolute Deviations by Advice Quality 
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Figure 5: Histogram of Absolute Deviations by Advice Quality for Round 1 only 
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Appendix 
 






This is an experiment about decision making.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money, 
which will be paid to you in cash.  
 
All monetary amounts in the experiment are denominated in an experimental currency called 
francs.  At the end of the experiment your earnings in francs will be converted into dollars at 
the rate of .0375 dollars per franc.  You will also be paid an additional $5.00 simply for 




As you read these instructions you will be in a room with a number of other subjects.  Each 
subject has been randomly assigned an ID number and a computer terminal.  The experiment 
consists of 10 decision rounds.  In each decision round you will be paired with a 
computerized subject which has been programmed to make the same decision in every round.  
The computerized subject randomly matched with you will be called your computerized pair 
member. Your computerized pair member will remain the same throughout the entire 
experiment. 
 
Unless you are in the first group to participate in this experiment, when you start the 
experiment you will receive advice on how to make your decisions from a subject who 
participated in the experiment immediately prior to you.  This subject will earn an additional 
payment equal to your earnings from the 10 decision rounds that you complete in the 
experiment.  Besides this advice, you will also be able to see the history of the previous 10 
decision rounds of the subject who is giving you advice.  After your 10 decision rounds you 
will leave advice to a new subject on how to make decisions, and you will receive an 
additional payment equal to the earnings of the subject you give advice to in his or her 10 




In the experiment you will perform a simple task.  Attached to these instructions is a sheet 
called the Decision Cost Table. This sheet shows 101 numbers from 0 to 100 in column 1.  
These are your decision numbers.  Associated with each decision number is a decision cost, 
which is listed in column 2.  Note that the higher the decision number chosen, the greater is 






  13Enter a number between 0 and 100: ________      
 
             Decision              Random   Total      Fixed                         Total 
Period   Number    Cost    Number   Number  Payment   Earnings    Earnings 
 
 
In each decision round the computer will ask you to choose a decision number. Your 
computerized pair member will also choose a decision number.  Remember that it will always 
choose the same decision number, which will be 37 in every decision round.  You, of course, 
are free to choose any number you wish among those listed in column 1 of your Decision 
Cost Table.  Therefore, in each round of the experiment, you and your computerized pair 
member will each select a decision number separately (and you know that it will always 
choose 37).  Using the number keys, you will enter your selected number, which will appear 
in the space following “Enter a number between 0 and 100,” and then hit the Enter key. At 
this point the computer will display the round number, the decision number you selected for 
the round, and the decision cost associated with your decision number.  The computer will 
then prompt you to press the Enter key again, at which time the computer will generate your 
Random Number.  Your random number will be one of the 81 whole numbers that lie 
between -40 and +40 (including zero), and each of these numbers is equally likely to be 
selected in each round.  Your computerized pair member’s random number is also equally 
likely to be any one of the 81 whole numbers lying between -40 and +40.   The process that 
generates your random number is independent of the process that generates your 
computerized pair member’s random number.  That is, there is no relationship between the 
random number generated for you and the random number generated for your computerized 
pair member. Your Random Number and your Total Number (Decision Number + Random 
Number) will both be displayed. At this time the computer will have also generated your 
computerized pair member’s Random Number and will compute It’s Total Number as well.  
 
Computation of Payoffs 
 
Your payment in each decision round will be computed as follows.  After your random 
number has been selected and your computerized pair member’s random number has been 
selected, the computer will then prompt you to press the Enter key again, at which time the 
computer will compare your Total Number to the Total Number of your computerized pair 
member.  Your fixed payment will be 29 if your Total Number is bigger than or equal to your 
computerized pair member’s Total Number.  Your fixed payment will be  17.2 if your 
computerized pair member’s Total Number is bigger than your Total Number.   After 
determining which fixed payment you receive, the computer will subtract your associated 
decision cost from your fixed payment to determine your Earnings for the round.  The 
computer will also calculate your Total Earnings over the course of the experiment, ie, the 
earnings you have accumulated in each round.  Your fixed payment, earnings, and total 




After round 1 is over, you will perform the same procedure for round 2, and so on for 10 
rounds.  In each round you will choose a decision number and generate a random number by 
pressing the Enter key at the computer’s prompt.  Your Total Number will be compared to 
the Total Number of your computerized pair member, and the computer will calculate your 
fixed payment and earnings for the round.  When round 10 is completed, the computer will 
 
  14convert your total earnings in francs into dollars and display this amount. We will pay you 
this amount plus the $5.00 show-up fee. 
 
In rounds after round 1, the results from earlier rounds will be displayed on the screen, and 
you may refer to these results at any time.  The results displayed are: the period number, the 
decision number in that period, the associated decision cost, your random number and total 
number, your earnings, and your total earnings (both in francs).  You will also receive the 
same information from the 10 decision rounds completed by the subject who left you advice.  
You may refer to this information at any time as well.   
 
At the end of your 10 decision rounds, you will be able to leave advice to a new subject in the 
experiment.  You will type this advice using a word processor on your computer.  This advice 
will be printed and given to a new subject, along with a printout of the history of your 
decisions.  You will receive a second payment, equal to the earnings of the subject who 
receives your advice in his or her 10 decision rounds.  You will be notified by E-mail or 
telephone when your second payment is ready. 
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and the monitor will come and answer it. 
 
Let us begin. 
 
 
  15Decision Cost Table 
 
NUMBER       COST  NUMBER     COST NUMBER     COST NUMBER    COST 
        
0  0.000        
1 0.002  26 1.352 51 5.202 76 11.552 
2 0.008  27 1.458 52 5.408 77 11.858 
3 0.018  28 1.568 53 5.618 78 12.168 
4 0.032  29 1.682 54 5.832 79 12.482 
5 0.05  30  1.8 55 6.05 80 12.8 
6 0.072  31 1.922 56 6.272 81 13.122 
7 0.098  32 2.048 57 6.498 82 13.448 
8 0.128  33 2.178 58 6.728 83 13.778 
9 0.162  34 2.312 59 6.962 84 14.112 
10 0.2  35  2.45 60 7.2 85 14.45 
11 0.242  36 2.592 61 7.442 86 14.792 
12 0.288  37 2.738 62 7.688 87 15.138 
13 0.338  38 2.888 63 7.938 88 15.488 
14 0.392  39 3.042 64 8.192 89 15.842 
15 0.45  40  3.2 65 8.45 90 16.2 
16 0.512  41 3.362 66 8.712 91 16.562 
17 0.578  42 3.528 67 8.978 92 16.928 
18 0.648  43 3.698 68 9.248 93 17.298 
19 0.722  44 3.872 69 9.522 94 17.672 
20 0.8  45  4.05 70 9.8 95 18.05 
21 0.882  46 4.232 71 10.082 96 18.432 
22 0.968  47 4.418 72 10.368 97 18.818 
23 1.058  48 4.608 73 10.658 98 19.208 
24 1.152  49 4.802 74 10.952 99 19.602 
25 1.25  50  5 75 11.25 100 20 
 
 
 
  16